Emperor Taizong of Song

Emperor Taizong of Song, Zhao Guangyi, was the second emperor of the Song Dynasty (reigned 976–997 AD). He was the third son of Zhao Hongyin (posthumously honored as Emperor Xuanzu of Song) and Lady Du (Empress Dowager Zhaoxian). His original name was “Kuangyi,” but he changed it to “Guangyi” after the founding of the Song Dynasty to avoid the taboo of his elder brother’s name, Zhao Kuangyin. Upon ascending the throne, he renamed himself “Jiong.”

Zhao Jiong entered officialdom through the hereditary appointment system during the Later Zhou dynasty. After the establishment of the Song Dynasty, he was appointed as the Commander of the Palace Guards. From July 961, he served as the prefect of Kaifeng for an extended period. In 973, he was ennobled as King of Jin, a position higher than that of the prime minister. In October 976, following the sudden death of Zhao Kuangyin, Zhao Jiong hastily took the throne.

Upon his accession, he continued to pursue the unification efforts left unfinished by his brother. In 978, he forced Chen Hongjin of Zhang and Quan provinces and the ruler of Wuyue, Qian Chu, to submit to his rule. The following year, he personally led a campaign against Taiyuan, extinguishing the Northern Han and ending the fragmented and separatist situation of the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period. He then attacked the Liao Dynasty, attempting to seize the Yan Yun region but suffered defeat at the Gaoliang River. Injured by an arrow, he was forced to flee in haste. In 986, he launched another northern expedition but was again defeated by the Liao, after which he adopted a defensive stance towards them. Additionally, his military efforts against the regional powers like the Dingnan Army (Dangxiang) and Jinghai Army (Jiaozhi) that had been independent since the late Tang Dynasty were unsuccessful.

He adhered to a policy of strengthening internal administration while keeping a low profile externally, further centralizing power. He founded the Institute for the Veneration of Literature, compiled works such as the “Taiping Yulan,” and significantly expanded the Imperial examination system to enhance the culture of valuing civil affairs over military prowess. This policy marked the beginning of a path that emphasized civil over military achievements, which would eventually become a significant aspect of the “ancestral laws” of the Song Dynasty.

The hereditary appointment system allowed the children and relatives of officials to be appointed to government positions during key events such as the emperor’s birthday, sacrificial ceremonies, an official’s retirement, or the death of an official in office. Sometimes, after a minister’s death, the appointments among his children and relatives could number in the dozens. This practice contributed to the large number of officials in the Song Dynasty. Although it did mobilize some talent, it also allowed many unskilled aristocratic youths to enter the bureaucracy with ease, gradually taking up high positions, to the detriment of those who dedicated themselves to scholarly pursuits.

Emperor Taizong of Song, also known historically by various titles such as “Master of Poisonous Tactics” and “Leader of the Axe Gang,” was best known as the “Sorghum River Chariot God.”

The title “Sorghum River Chariot God” refers to Zhao Guangyi’s campaign to reclaim the Yan Yun sixteen prefectures (also known as You Yun sixteen prefectures) that Shi Jingtang had ceded to the Liao Dynasty. During the battle at Sorghum River, after being shot in the thigh, Zhao Guangyi personally drove a donkey cart in a daring escape, covering a thousand miles overnight from Youzhou (present-day Beijing) to Zhuozhou (present-day Baoding), all while eluding the Liao cavalry. Thus, Zhao Guangyi was humorously dubbed by netizens as the “Sorghum River Chariot God.”

Zhuozhou and Youzhou are nearly 200 kilometers apart, and cavalry were historically the most mobile and fastest units among ancient armies. Have you ever wondered how Zhao Guangyi managed to evade the Liao cavalry over such a long distance with just a donkey cart? Let’s travel back to the battle of Sorghum River in 979 and see what really happened.

The battle erupted not only because Zhao Guangyi was determined to retake the Yan Yun sixteen prefectures, but also because he was feeling quite ambitious. At that time, he had just personally led his troops to annihilate the Northern Han Dynasty, securing the legendary general Yang Ye (the prototype for the elder Yang of the Yang Family Generals), and had also defeated the Liao reinforcements for the Northern Han. This made Zhao Guangyi believe the Liao were not much of a threat.

Ignoring the objections of his generals, he led his still unrested army north to attack the Liao. Initially, the Liao were caught off guard by Zhao Guangyi’s continued advance, resulting in several consecutive victories for the Song army, which successively recaptured Zhuozhou, Shuozhou, Yingzhou, Yunzhou, and Huanzhou.

Overjoyed, Zhao Guangyi pursued the retreating Liao forces, pushing deep into Liao territory even before capturing Youzhou. At that time, the Liao ruler was Xiao Chuo, who upon hearing the news, immediately strategized a counterattack, ordering Prime Minister Yelü Sha to lead a large force against Zhao Guangyi while also commanding General Yelü Xiuge in Youzhou to cut off the Song army’s retreat.

To encircle and annihilate the Song army and capture Zhao Guangyi in one fell swoop was the plan, unbeknownst to Zhao Guangyi himself. He continued to lead the Song army northward. On July 6, 979, in the lunar calendar, Zhao Guangyi arrived at the Gaoliang River (now west of Xizhimen in Beijing) with his troops, where they encountered the Liao army led by Yelu Sha. Zhao Guangyi ordered Yang Ye to engage in battle and quickly defeated Yelu Sha. As the Song army was about to pursue Yelu Sha, Yelu Xiuge’s forces from the Liao army launched a surprise attack from the right flank. The Song army was caught off-guard and suffered a crushing defeat, losing their armor in their haste to retreat, while Yelu Sha also counterattacked.

The sudden ambush by Yelu Xiuge put the Song army in a difficult position, being attacked from both front and back. However, the Song army still had the capability to fight back, and victory was not yet decided. Yelu Xiuge, a renowned general of the Liao, knew the strategic principle of capturing the leader first. He led his elite troops directly towards the Song army’s core, aiming for Zhao Guangyi under the yellow canopy. Zhao Guangyi, a scholar by origin, was completely terrified by the situation. Before he could react, an arrow from the Liao army had already struck his thigh. Zhao Guangyi’s personal guards hastily retreated while protecting him, continually clashing with the pursuing Liao soldiers. Zhao Guangyi, despite his injury, found a donkey cart and drove off alone, abandoning the main army.

Seeing this, Yelu Xiuge dispatched cavalry to pursue him. Logically, they should have been able to catch up since horses are faster than donkeys, and Zhao Guangyi was driving a cart, not riding the donkey, which would be slower, especially with an arrow in his thigh. However, the cavalry sent by Yelu Xiuge inexplicably failed to catch him. What could be the reason?

First and foremost, it must be acknowledged that Zhao Guangyi’s driving skills were exceptional. Relying on a donkey cart, he managed to travel nearly 200 kilometers overnight. On the evening of July 6, Zhao Guangyi was at Gaoliang River, and by the early morning of July 7, he had reached the outskirts of Zhuozhou City. Without such impressive driving skills, Zhao Guangyi would have been caught by the Liao cavalry before even leaving Gaoliang River.

Speed alone was not sufficient, especially since Zhao Guangyi was hindered by the arrow in his thigh, which would have affected both his driving speed and stamina. Considering that the Song army still had the strength to fight, it is likely that they engaged the main forces of the Liao, while Zhao Guangyi’s personal guards managed to hold off Yelu Xiuge’s cavalry in the chaos, buying time for Zhao Guangyi’s escape.

The Song military invited Zhao Guangyi to enter the city, but Zhao Guangyi did not dare to enter. He was worried that Yelu Xiuge would lead a large army southward, turning Zhuozhou into a battleground. Thus, Zhao Guangyi ordered Gao Qiong, who was in charge of Zhuozhou, to fortify its defenses while he continued to flee for his life. Due to an arrow wound in his thigh, Zhao Guangyi could not ride a horse and had to drive a donkey cart to escape over 80 kilometers south to Jintai Tun (present-day southeast of Yi County in Hebei, thirty kilometers away).

Only then did Zhao Guangyi dare to stop and observe. After waiting for two days without seeing any sign of the large army, Zhao Guangyi sent scouts and finally learned that the remnants of the Song army had been pursued by the Liao forces to Zhuozhou. However, they managed to repel the Liao forces by relying on the strong city defenses of Zhuozhou and then stationed themselves there. Zhao Guangyi also learned that after his escape from the Gaoliang River, the morale of the Song army had weakened.

To stabilize morale, some generals proposed crowning Zhao Dezao, the son of Song Taizu Zhao Kuangyin, who was with the army, as emperor. However, before they could act, the soldiers began to scatter and flee, forcing the generals to retreat. Enraged by this news, Zhao Guangyi hastily ordered a withdrawal back to the court from Zhuozhou, planting the seeds of distrust towards military commanders among Zhao Guangyi and most of the subsequent emperors of the Song Dynasty.

The battle at the Gaoliang River, sparked by Zhao Guangyi’s flight, left the Song army leaderless and demoralized, ultimately leading to their defeat by the Liao forces. This battle, fought by the elite of the Song Dynasty, resulted in heavy losses. The necessary defensive posture the Song army had to adopt afterward meant that the Song Dynasty lost the ambition to independently reclaim the sixteen prefectures of Yanyun.